ScreenConnect is a legitimate Remote Management and Monitoring tool which has been abused to act as a C2 mechanism by threat actors, including at least one HIVE SPIDER affiliate. If that’s not enough, the ScreenConnect server was found to suffer from a trivially exploited authentication bypass vulnerability in February 2024.
This rule matches strings found in the ScreenConnect MSI package, commonly used to install the application:
rule PUP_RMM_ScreenConnect_msi {
meta:
description = "Matches strings found in ScreenConnect MSI packages, often abused for unauthorised access."
last_modified = "2024-03-02"
author = "@petermstewart"
DaysofYara = "62/100"
sha256 = "80b6ec0babee522290588e324026f7c16e3de9d178b9e846ae976ab432058ce7"
sha256 = "f8c2b122da9c9b217eada5a1e5fde92678925f1bb2ea847253538ffda274f0b9"
strings:
$magic = { d0 cf 11 e0 a1 b1 1a e1 }
$clsid = { 84 10 0c 00 00 00 00 00 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 46 }
$a1 = "ScreenConnect.Client.dll"
$a2 = "ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe"
$a3 = "Share My Desktop"
$a4 = "Grab a still image of the remote machine desktop"
condition:
$magic at 0 and
all of them
}
While researching ScreenConnect I also wrote a utility rule to detect MSI installers:
rule file_msi {
meta:
description = "Finds Microsoft Installer (.msi) files"
last_modified = "2024-03-02"
author = "@petermstewart"
DaysofYara = "62/100"
strings:
$magic = { d0 cf 11 e0 a1 b1 1a e1 }
$clsid = { 84 10 0c 00 00 00 00 00 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 46 }
condition:
$magic at 0 and
$clsid
}
Find the rest of my 100DaysofYARA posts here, and the rules themselves on my Github repository.
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