Following on from yesterday’s rule on BumbleBee’s obfuscated PowerShell loader, today’s rule matches on strings found in the DLL payload.
rule MAL_BumbleBee_DLL_strings {
meta:
description = "Matches strings found in BumbleBee DLL sample extracted from initial PowerShell loader."
last_modified = "2024-01-30"
author = "@petermstewart"
DaysofYara = "30/100"
sha256 = "39e300a5b4278a3ff5fe48c7fa4bd248779b93bbb6ade55e38b22de5f9d64c3c"
strings:
$a1 = "powershell -ep bypass -Command"
$a2 = " -Command \"Wait-Process -Id "
$a3 = "schtasks.exe /F /create /sc minute /mo 4 /TN \""
$a4 = "/ST 04:00 /TR \"wscript /nologo"
$b1 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_ComputerSystemProduct"
$b2 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_ComputerSystem"
$b3 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem"
$b4 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration" wide
$b5 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_NTEventlogFile" wide
$b6 = "SELECT * FROM Win32_PnPEntity" wide
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and
3 of ($a*) and
4 of ($b*)
}
Find the rest of my 100DaysofYARA posts here, and the rules themselves on my Github repository.